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IMPACT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT ON EAST ASIA: A KOREAN
PERSPECTIVE
Jisu Kim"

INTRODUCTION
-On August 12, 1992, President Bush announced that the United
States, Canada, and Mexico would enter into the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which will eliminate tariffs and non-tariff
trade barriers among the three countries over the next 15 years.' The
agreement will take effect in January 1994, after approval by the legislature in each country. Once ratified, the NAFTA will create an enormous free trade area, with 360 million people and a total trade output
of almost $6 trillion The agreement is expected to provide considerable free trade benefits for North Americans, through trade expansion
and the resulting effect on consumer welfare Non-participating coun• LL.B. (1985), M.P.A. (1987), Seoul National University. Since 1988, Mr. Kim
has been a secretary to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea. M.L.L (haster
of Legal Institutions), School of Law, University of Wisconsin, 1993. The views and
opinions expressed by the author in this Article are his own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the government of the Republic of Korea.
1. See Kenneth A. Bacon, Trade Pact Is Likely To Step Up Business Even Before Approval, WALL ST. I., Aug. 13, 1992, at A2, A10 (stating that the agreement
will eliminate all tariffs between the three member nations and will create a free
trade zone extending from the Yukon to the Yucatan).
2. Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Potential
Framework of An Agreement, 14 HOus. J. INr'L L. 85 (1991).
3. See Paul Wonnacott & Mark Lutz, Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?,
in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE PoUcY 59, 62-65 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,
1989) (stating that in his classic analysis, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950), Jacob
Viner argued that free trade agreements (FrAs) can create new trading opportunities
by reducing barriers to bilateral flows of goods between the partner countries). However, FIAs also can divert trade by according preferences to the FTA partners that
allowed them to replace lower-cost suppliers from third party countries. d Viner's
analysis, however, attracted criticism for overlooking the dynamic effects of trade
diversion and economies of scale. Id In addition, trade diversion can promote growth,
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tries in Asia, however, are likely to suffer economic hardships as a result of the NAFTA's potential to divert trade away from Asian markets.'
This Article examines the anticipated impact of the NAFTA on East
Asian countries, and reviews the possibility of free trade agreements
(FTAs) between the United States and the East Asian countries. Part I
briefly summarizes the NAFTA negotiations and outlines the contents of
the agreement. Part II explores the likely impact of the NAFTA on East
Asian countries, particularly on Japan and Korea. Part III discusses the
possibility of separate bilateral FTAs between the United States and
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and how each trade agreement might create
incentives for other regional agreements. The conclusion of this Article
suggests that FTAs between the United States and East Asia could serve
as building blocks for the United States' trade policy goal of establishing a free trade area spanning the Pacific Rim, from Australia to Chile.
I.

NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONTENTS OF THE NAFTA

The NAFTA is an outgrowth of the United States-Canada' Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA)' of 1988. The fact that Mexico, a developing country, is entering into a pact similar to the CFTA, with two developed
countries as its partners, has distinguished the agreement from other
trade agreements. Mexico's labor-intensive industrial structure7 was one

and thus trade, by lowering input costs for producers, thereby increasing consumer
welfare. Id.
4. See id (discussing the consequences of FTAs for non-participating countries).
5. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights 1991, 23-27
(1992) [hereinafter Trade Highlights 1991] (indicating that the United States and Canada are each other's largest trading partner).
6. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Jan.
2, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851. See United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-53 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA Summary] (giving
President Bush's summary of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement). See
also William H. Cavitt, Western Hemisphere Free Trade Initiatives, 18 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 271, 272-79 (1992) (outlining the contents of the CFTA).
The CFTA tariff abolition schedule will remain in force regardless of the
NAFTA provisions. Bacon, supra note 1, at A10.
7. The average manufacturing wage in Mexico is estimated to be only 10% to
15% of manufacturing wages in the United States. See United States-Mexico Economic
Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 123-34 (1990) [hereinafter Economic Relations
Hearing] (testimony of Professor Rudiger Dornbusch).
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of the most important factors leading to the proposal for the pacts Another factor was Mexican President Salinas' courageous economic policies,9 which have liberalized, privatized and revitalized' the formerly
stagnant Mexican economy, to make Mexico the third largest trading

8. Id See Ignacio Trigueros, A Free Trade Agreement Between Mexico and the
United States, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 255, 266-67 (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 1989) (stating that "traditional gains from trade agreements suggested
that greater benefits from import liberalization arise for economies whose economic
structure fulfills two characteristics: strong differences between its trading partners, and
flexibility in the resource allocation process").
9. Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, at 49-53 (testimony of U.S. Trade
Representative, Carla A. Hills). It was former Mexican President de Ia Madrid who
began to rescue the standstill Mexican economy in the mid-1980s. Id. Madrid changed
the previously protective Mexican market policy into an open and competitive policy
in 1985, with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund In 1986 to reduce
trade barriers. I
However, since the Salinas Administration took office in 1988, the United
States has observed an even sharper change in Mexican trade policies. Id. Mexico
acted unilaterally to open its markets to trade, and in some cases went beyond the
formal requirements of the GAT1. Id The average trade-weighted tariff has fallen
from over 25% in the rnid-1980s to about 9% in 1991. AL Import licenses, which in
1983 controlled all Mexican imports, were restricted in scope so that these licenses
now cover only 250 items, or approximately 7% of the value of U.S. exports to
Mexico. Id
In 1989, Mexico liberalized its foreign investment laws by issuing new regulations governing foreign investment. d. Mexico also enacted an intellectual property
law in 1991. 1&
Of the 1,155 enterprises owned by the Mexican government in 1982, 601 businesses are now privatized and 801 are authorized for divestment from public ownership. Id. Additionally, as a result of aggressive external debt restructuring under the
Brady Plan, Mexico's debt servicing burden has declined. Id
10. Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, at 49-53. But see Lucinda Harper,
Slowdown in Mexico Is Felt in the U.S., WALL ST. ., Sept. 29, 1992, at A2 (stating
that in recent months the Mexican economy has lost some momentum). In part, the
slump is a consequence of the government's decision to launch an all-out effort to
pare down the annual inflation rate to a single digit. Id. Another factor contributing
to the economic setback was the stagnation among Mexico's principal trading partners,
particularly the United States. Id Many economists see the sluggishness in the Mexican economy as temporary, and maintain that the slowing may be a healthy factor for
Mexico in the long run. Id
Mexican companies face difficult choices in complying with the provisions of
NAFTA. See Matt Moffett, Mexican Companies Face Stark Choices In Adopting to
Free Trade Agreement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1992, at A13 (stating that many Mexican firms have to choose between finding a partner in order to expand, and going
out of business).
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partner of the United States."
The road to this agreement, however, has not been an easy one."
Because the pact involves all industrial sectors, negotiators experienced
difficulty in satisfying the various constituencies within all three countries. In the face of these obstacles, Mexican President Salinas and his
ruling party aggressively pursued the agreement, largely due to the fact
that Mexico is expected to reap the greatest benefits under the
NAFTA." Canada too, gained parliamentary approval of the agreement,

11. Trade Highlights 1991, supra note 5, at 23. Two-way trade between the
United States and Mexico in 1991 totalled $64 billion. Karen E. House, World Avoids
a Trade Nightmare, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1992, at A12. Mexico is the fastest growing market for United States exports. ld. U.S. exports to Mexico increased at an
average annual rate of 22% since 1987, while U.S. exports to Japan and Canada rose
only 15% and 9% respectively. Id.Many economic analysts predict that Mexico will
become the second largest market for United States exports in 1993, surpassing Japan.
It
12. See Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, at 69 (testimony of the Honorable Anne E. Brunsdale, Chairman of the International Trade Commission). In 1987,
the United States and Mexico signed the Framework of Principles and Procedures for
Consultation regarding Trade and Investment Relations. Id. The Framework established
ten working groups in five substantive areas: agriculture, investment and intellectual
property rights, services, tariffs, and industry. Id.
The 1989 Understanding regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks
(TIFs) represented a significant milestone in commercial relations between the United
States and Mexico. I Negotiations under TIFTs focused on specific production areas,
as well as cross-sectoral issues such as services, intellectual property rights, technology, investment, distribution problems, and various tariff and non-tariff barriers. id,
TIFTs further provided for a major change in the negotiations procedure whereby
bilateral, rather than individual, teams of government experts facilitated the resolution
of many issues before the negotiators met at the conference table. Id.
In June 1990, the Presidents of the United States and Mexico endorsed the
objective of a bilateral free trade agreement. Ii at 52. In August 1990, President
Salinas formally proposed the initiation of negotiations for a free trade agreement
between the two countries, since U.S. trade laws limit access to "fast track" implementing procedures to FTAs that are requested by other countries. Id.; see infra note
21 (explaining the implications of fast track status). In September 1990, President
Bush notified the U.S. Congress of Canada's desire to participate in the negotiations.
Ii
In February 1991, the Presidents of the United States and Mexico, together
with the Prime Minister of Canada, announced their intention to begin negotiations on
the NAFTA. Cavitt, supra note 6, at 283. The U.S. Congress extended its delegation
of authority to the President to negotiate under the fast track provisions in May 1991.
Id. The NAFTA negotiations formally began in June 1991, when the trade ministers
of the three countries agreed upon the modalities of the negotiations. Id,
13. See generally Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, at 284-85 (outlining
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despite the fact that segments of the Canadian population have expressed
strong disapproval of the NAFTA." In the United States, support for
the agreement is mixed, with many opponents to the pact voicing their
concerns.
Two important issues related to this free trade agreement with Mexico
are unemployment due to economic displacement, and environmental
protection. 6 United States negotiators emphasize that the enlarged North
American common market, and the growth of exports through the use of
Mexico's cheap labor, will produce more jobs in the long run." The
the benefits Mexico will receive as a result of the free trade agreement).
14. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & David Rogers, Free Trade Treaty Casts Large Shadow As Political Issue in Presidential Race, WALL ST. ., Aug. 13, 1992, at A10.
Only 29% of Canadians favored the NAFrA, and labor unions and opposition political parties opposed the agreement. Id. Despite strong opposition, the Canadian government, with its parliamentary majority, [Is EXaEcr= TO HAVE/HAD] little difficulty
in gaining approval of the NAFTA. Id.
15. See Bob Davis & Asra Q. Nomani, Jolt to NAFTA: Federal Judge's Ruling
Could Be a Death Blow to Free-Trade Accord, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1993, at I (discussing various groups' concerns over a U.S. court's mandate of an environmental impact statement prior to U.S. ratification of NAFTA); Bob Davis, Free Trade Pact's
Details Are Sparking Squabbles As Congress Takes Up Review, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8,
1992, at A2, A4 (stating that the NAFTA sparked strong opposition by some members of Congress); Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, passim; Proposed Negotiation of A Free Trade Agreement with Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter Negotiation Hearing] (statement of Pharis J. Harvey, Executive Director of
the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, in opposition to fast
track consideration).
Due to the debate over the NAFTA, the agreement became one of the main
political issues during the presidential campaign in the United States. See Birnbaum
and Rogers, supra note 14, at A10 (stating that advisors to President Bush hoped to
gain political support with the agreement, while Clinton continued to play both sides
of the trade issue). See also Bob Davis, Candidates' iews on Trade Accord May Be
Undercut, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at A2, AS (stating that the Clinton campaign
was undecided on whether or not to support the NAFIA).
16. Negotiation Hearing, supra note 15, at 255-63. Problems involving workers
rights and workplace safety in Mexico are also points of concern. Id. U.S. labor
unions point out that such problems in Mexico may have an adverse influence on
American workers. See id. (citing the testimony of Pharis J. Harvey); see also
Thomas R. Howard, Free Trade Between the United States and Mexico: Minimizing
the Adverse Effects on American Workers, 18 WM. M TCHELL L. REv. 507, 514-17
(1992) (arguing that laborers possess fundamental rights and that the denial of such
rights are "objectionable" both in the human rights and the international trade context).
17. Negotiation Hearing, supra note 15, at 28-34 (testimony of Ambassador Carla
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unemployment of unskilled workers in the United States, however, remains the focus of a great deal of concern."5 A second concern for the
United States is Mexico's lack of adequate environmental protection
laws, their enforcement mechanisms, and the anticipated ecological damage from Mexico's stimulated economy, one of the fastest developing
economies in the world."9 Although these worries cast a shadow on the
potential for Congressional approval of the NAFTA," the agreement's
chances for ratification are heightened by the so-called "fast track"'"
procedures for Congressional approval.
When the Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime
Minister of Canada initialed the NAFTA on October 7, 1992, a summary of the NAFTA, was released, listing the goals of the NAFTA as
follows.'
(1) Tariffs and other barriers on trade and agricultural products" will

A. Hills arguing that the NAFTA will increase job opportunities).
18. Negotiation Hearing, supra note 15, at 28-34. These worries concerning job
loss have already proven true in some areas. See Matt Moffett, U.S. Manufacturers
Already Are Adapting To Mexican Free Trade: Even Before Pact Is Ratified, Some
Step Up Production And Some Move It South, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1992, at Al,
A6 (stating that some American corporations are already transferring jobs from the
United States to Mexico).
19. See Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7, at 223-43 (highlighting some
of the problems of the maquiladoras, the foreign-owned companies operating in the
border region of the United States and Mexico). United States concerns about environmental problems in Mexico increased due to pollution from maquiladoms, which
have created industrial belts along the United States-Mexico border and where foreign
investment has concentrated for the manufacturing of export products. Leslie Kochan,
The Maquiladorasand Toxics, reprinted in Economic Relations Hearing, supra note 7,
at 223-43. Foreign investments continue to increase as the peso devalues. Id. As some
in the United States feared, hundreds of American firms have moved their factories
into maquiladora regions during the past decade, and do not seem to be deterred by
the havoc done to the environment. Id. Environmentalists maintain that these firms
were lured by Mexico's "rock-bottom" wages, and by the lack of effective environmental regulations and enforcement by the Mexican government. Id
20. See Birnbaum and Rogers, supra note 14, at A10 (stating that there is little
doubt that Congress will approve the NAFTA).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988). Under the "fast track" procedure, Congress must
approve or disapprove any agreement without amendment within a given time. kd The
procedure has an important impact in the conduct of negotiations, because absent fast
track status, United States negotiators could not assure their negotiating partners that
the agreement would be the only one voted on by Congress. Cavitt, supra note 6, at
283.
22. Bacon, supra note 1, at A10.
23. Bacon, supra note 1, at A10. Mexico will abolish tariffs on half of its crop
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be phased out over the next 15 years. Tariffs and other barriers will
remain in force on imports from countries outside the new free trade
zone in order to advantage North American products.
(2) Strict rules of origin will be established, such that in order to
qualify for duty-free trade within North America, products must be
manufactured predominantly in North America. For automobiles, the
NAFFA will phase in a North American content standard of 62.5%20 of
the net cost of a car. Other vehicles and automotive parts must be 60%
North American-made in order to qualify for duty-free treatment within
the trading bloc. Similarly, computers, electronics, textiles, and apparel
must meet rigid rules of origin standards to qualify for duty-free trade
with the free trade zone.
(3) In the area of financial services, Mexico will gradually allow
United States and Canadian banks, brokerage firms, finance companies
and insurance companies free access to its markets, after a six-year
transition period during which market share will be limited. Each
country agreed to grant "national treatment" to North American financial
institutions, meaning that they will be subject to the same rules as indigenous institutions.
(4) Intellectual property rights protection will be revised, such that

imports from the United States when the NAFTA goes into effect. rd Tariffs on the
remainder of Mexican crop imports will end within 10 years. Id Tariffs on sensitive
products, including com and dry beans for Mexico and orange juice and sugar for the

United States, will be phased out over 15 years. Id The three countries agreed to
strive for domestic price-support policies that would not distort trade. Id See Trade
Pact Would Curb Competition In Farm Products, Costing Consumers, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 1992, at A2 (stating that the NAFIA will curb competition in farm prod.
ucts, ultimately resulting in higher costs to consumers).

24. See Bacon, supra note 1, at A10 (stating that the NAFrA provisions are a
"significant increase from the CFTA, which set a 50% domestic-content standard, but
it is less than the 70% the U.S. auto industry wanted to fence out Japanese and other
imported parts"). Under the NAFIA, the auto industry will have four years to increase North American content to 57%, and an additional four years to reach 62.5%.
t. Both Canada and Mexico fought for lower content requirements to protect existing

or encourage greater Japanese investment. t See also Customs' Enforcement of the
Rules of Origin Provisions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hear-

ings Before the Subcomnr. on Trade and the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 119-37 (1991) (discussing the
proposal of the United States Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association to include a Rule of Origin in the NAFTA).
25. See Lawrence E. Koslow, Mexican Foreign Investment Lais, 18 WiM.
MrrcrM.L L. REV. 441, 457-58 (1992) (articulating the four basic rules governing
foreign investors in the CFTA).
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high-technology, entertainment and consumer goods producers in the
United States will enjoy more substantial patent, trademark and copyright protection. In addition, compulsory licensing will be limited, resolving important issues between the United States and Canada.
II.

IMPACT OF THE NAFTA ON EAST ASIA

While the NAFTA contains mechanisms benefiting North American
business through trade liberalization, these same mechanisms disadvantage companies operating outside of the United States, Mexico and Canada.' North American products made by United States manufacturers
that exploit cheap Mexican labor, will be strongly competitive not only
in the North American common market, but also in foreign markets.
European countries may be able to avoid successfully the expected negative trade effects of the NAFTA by simultaneously developing the European common market.' Moreover, many European companies have positioned themselves to cope with the NAFTA by investing in North
American businesses, thereby securing access to the opportunities presented by the NAFTA.' By contrast, Asian countries, whose national
growth rates are substantially dependent upon exports to the United
States, expect to sustain losses in market share as a result of the
NAFTA.

26. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing how the NAFTA provisions will benefit North American manufacturing and high-technology companies).
27. The European Community (EC), a customs union, is a regional arrangement
differing from a free trade zone like that created by the NAFTA. The main difference
is that in the former, the control over economic policy for third countries is ceded to
a supranational mechanism, like the European Congress. A Unifying Europe Tries to
Dot Its I's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at Cl, C3. Under NAFTA, however, each
member maintains control.
In spite of the Maastricht treaty on European unification, divisive debates in
France and Britain, which followed Denmark's decision to vote on the treaty in May
1993, cast a shadow over the goal of a unified Europe. See Europe Copes With the
Details of Unity, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1992, at DI (stating that France and Britain
are divided over the timing of a vote on the treaty).
28. See Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Japanese View Toward NAFTA and Regional
Trade Zones, 2 DUKE I. CoMP. & INT'L L. 297, 302-03 (1992) (stating that France
and Germany made substantial investments into Mexican plants along the United
States-Canada border). Less than 5% of the approximately 2000 plants located in
Mexico in 1991 were owned by Japan. Id These maquiladora plants allow companies
to take advantage of regulations that allow foreign companies to enjoy duty-free status
as long as the final products are exported from Mexico. IL at 302 n.35.
29. See Leah Makabenton, Trade: NAFTA Casts a Pall Over Asian-Pacfic
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After the NAFTA provisions were declared, Japan expressed concern
that the NAFTA was inconsistent with principles articulated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)Y Korea expressed similar
concerns about the validity of the NAFTA.Y Because these two countries greatly depend on United States markets, however, neither is likely
to bring legal action against the NAFTA. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the GAIT would find that the NAFI7A constitutes a violation of the
GAT provisions." Indeed, the United States could use the NAFTA
both as an incentive and as a threat to force further liberalization of
trade within the GAThC'
Grouping, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (noting that Asian nations fear that under NAFTA, Mexico will take a
larger market share at the expense of Asian nations, while Japan fears the effect of
NAFTA rules of origin and content requirements).
30. Japan's MIT Tells Dunker It's Unhappy About NAFTA, REUrERs, Aug. 31,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. The GA'IT requires that signatory countries not discriminate among their trading partners, and must extend equal
treatment to all "most favored nations," meaning trading partners with very beneficial
stature. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TI.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATI]. This is referred to as most favored nation status. Id However, the GATT also recognizes and permits the existence of closer economic relationships between selected countries. Jeffrey J. Schott, Afore Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POUCY 24 (1989). GATT therefore

allows nations to avoid full adherence to most favored nation status when a bilateral
or multilateral free trade agreement meets certain criteria. GAT, art. XXIV. Free
trade agreements conform to GATT requirements when GATT delegates are provided
detailed notice of the agreement, the agreement applies to "substantially all" the trade
between the parties, and the agreement does not increase trade barriers for other
countries. Id. However, as Mr. Schott notes:
The provisions of Article XXIV are vague, however, as to whether an FTA
must be on balance trade creating. The GAIT merely Implies that "the desirability of increasing freedom of trade" through FTAs or customs unions is the
rationale for the derogation from the MFN obligation. However, the presumption
that an FIA must be more trade creating than trade diverting has been incorporated into GATT working party reviews of PTA notifications, and is now generally considered the key standard by which to judge the value of FTAs to
third countries.
Schott, supra, at 24.
31. See Asia Wary of NAFTA Trade Protection, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that South Korea hoped that the
NAFIA would promote world trade in a manner consistent with GAIT principles).
32. See Schott, supra note 30, at 24-25 (indicating that between 1948 and 1988,
none of the 69 FTAs and preferential trade agreements examined by GAIT were held
incompatible with GATT rules). However, only four of these agreements were found
to be consistent with the requirements of Article XXIV. Id
33. Schott, supra note 30, at 2; see Negotiation Hearing, supra note 15, at 23
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Despite its concerns about the NAFTA, however, Japan is in a far
better position to cope with the NAFTA than other Asian countries.
First, Japanese products are widely preferred over products from most
nations, both for their price and for their quality, and thus Japanese
exports may not significantly decline under the NAFTA.' Second, like
many European companies, Japanese businesses have already .made significant investments in the United States and Mexico, and have similarly
secured access to the North American market.' In the automobile industry, for example, which is one of Japan's largest export industries,'
Japanese manufacturers already own and operate several assembly plants
in North America. 7 Japanese auto parts companies also operate in
North America, and supply many high-technology components to transplanted Japanese assembly facilities. 8 Thus, profits from Japanese investment will continue to flow back to Japan through their North American production facilities despite requirements for a high rate of local

(testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills) (stating that the NAFTA will bring significant benefits by creating a free trade zone encompassing 360 million consumers and
producers).
34. See Michael Williams, Japan's Merchandise Trade Surplus Gains 25% to a
Record $12.07 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1992, at All (reporting that even
though the yen appreciated against the dollar, and therefore increased the dollar denomination sum of Japanese exports, Japan's trade surplus with the United States
increased for the twenty-first consecutive month in September, 1992).
35. Clive Cook, Fear of Finance: A survey of the Global Economy, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 19, 1992, at 17 (reporting that the Japanese contributed 22 perccnt of total
foreign auto investments of $214 billion in 1990, with much of that amount flowing
into the United States).
36. See Factors Affecting U.S. International Competitiveness (II): Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 676 (1991) (statement of the Honorable Sander M. Levin) [hereinafter International Competitiveness Hearing] (stating that Japan accounts for most of the United
States trade deficit in automotive products, including one hundred percent of the deficit in auto parts). In 1990, automotive products represented $53.3 billion of the $101
billion United States trade deficit, of which the deficit in auto parts was $10.4 billion. Id
37. See Toni Thompson & Jim Impoco, Reversal of Fortune, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 17, 1992, at 42 (reporting that by 1992, Japan had invested $9
billion in automotive factories which employed nearly 30,000 workers and supplied
17.6% of the U.S. car market). See, e.g. Luney, supra note 28, at 302 (indicating
that Nissan-Mexico plans to increase its production capacity in North America by
renovating existing Mexican plants and constructing a new factory by 1993).
38. See International Competitiveness Hearing, supra note 36, at 675 (stating that
more than 400 Japanese auto parts manufacturers have built factories in the United
States).
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content." Third, the Japanese have established a foothold in the North
American market through their heavy investment in assembly and manufacturing facilities,' and have successfully introduced their coordinated
system of keiretsu into the United States," enabling them to comply
with the stricter local content rules of the NAFTA. Finally, in order to
soften the ill-effects of the NAFTA, Japan was invited to lead a regional
economic group in Asia 2
Korea, like other Asian countries besides Japan, is gravely concerned
about the NAFTA.' Although Korea has reduced its trade dependence
on the United States, almost one-quarter of its total exports still go to
United States markets.' Therefore, Korea reacted quickly to the
NAFTA by promoting investment in North America, primarily to obtain
duty-free benefits. 4s In recent years, Korean companies have channeled

39. Luney, supra note 28, at 302-03.
40. See Cook, supra note 35, at 14 (stating that until recently, most foreign
direct investment flowed between the developed countries).
41. See MY. Yoshino, JAPAN'S MANAGERIAL SYsEm 148-49 (defining keiretsu
gaisho as finns affiliated with a joint company engaged in ordinary business dealings).
The Japanese system involves large firms forging a network of affiliated firms, primarily related through sub-contracting relationships into a single organization. Id at
155.
42. See Bruce Stokes, Japan's Asian Edge, 23 NAT'L J. 1620, 1629 (1991) (stating that Asian leaders called on Japan to lead an East Asian Economic Group
(EAEG) to defend Asian interests in an increasingly hostile trade environment).
43. See Lee Hao-Koo, The Impact of North American Free Trade Agreement on
Korean Industry, KOREAN EcoN. DAILY, Apr. 1, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuters File (stating that Korean exports to the United States will
suffer due to the NAFTA and increased competition with low-cost labor in Mexico).
Consumer electronics will be affected in the short term; products such as computers,
telecommunications equipment, automobiles and apparel will be affected in the longterm. Id
44. See Kim Dayong-Luan, South Korea's Export Machine Faces Problems,
REUMS, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that
in the flrst'half of 1992, Korea exported $8.72 billion worth of goods to the United
States, representing 23.8% of Korea's total exports). In 1992, Korea's exports to Japan, the United States and the EC represented 51.4% of its total exports, down from
70% in 1987. Id Korean products have lost their price competitiveness primarily due
to rapidly increasing wages and costs during the late 1980s. Id Increasing competition
from other developing countries has resulted in estimated losses to Korea of nearly
$7.6 billion in export revenue between 1988 and 1991. Id
45. See Gov't Promotes Investment in North America, KOREAN TmEs, Aug. 18,
1992, at 1, 7 (stating that in response to the NAFrA, the Korean government would
give various financial and tax incentives to companies which invest in North Amerca). Korea also decided to take steps to improve Korea-Mexico trade, and to conclude

892

AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 8:889

more than one-half of their total overseas investments into North American enterprises.' Unfortunately, however, most of the Korean investments, which were intended to overcome trade barriers and to avoid
wage hikes and labor disputes in Korea, are currently operating at a
loss.' 7 Korea, with limited capital, technology, and management resources, faces an uncertain future in the face of an increased number of regional trade agreements.
The prospect of the NAFTA has also spurred other nations to cooperate on regional economic issues. The likely success of the NAFTA,
coupled with Mexico's successful economic policies, has induced many
Central and South American countries to follow Mexico's
market-opening policies." In addition, if these countries successfully
implement their own economic agreements, which are already in existence in these regions," a single common market throughout the American continents may emerge in the near future."

quickly a double-taxation accord and an investment guarantee agreement. Id.

46. See Investment in NAFTA Countries Active, KOREA ECON. DAILY, Aug. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (indicating that from 1988 to
June 1992, 45% of Korea's gross overseas investment of $1.8 billion was made in
the three signatory nations of the NAFTA).

47. See South Korea: Labor, Cost Woes Follow Companies to Overseas Plants,
KOREA ECON. DAILY, Sept. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File
(reporting that labor disputes resulting from cultural differences, increased local-content

rules, and intense sales competition led to such unsuccessful profit results). This fallure caused a reduction in Korean overseas investment. Id.

48. See, e.g., James Bune, South American Trade Pact Spurs PetrochemicalFires,
HoUs. CHRON., Jan. 3, 1992, at Cl (stating that Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay have agreed to form a South American Common Market, which will eliminate
tariffs by 1995); Anne Veigle, Industry Applauds Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 13,
1992, at C1 (reporting that Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia renewed
their agreement to create a free trade area through the elimination of tariffs by 1995).
49. See Cavitt, supra note 6, at 284-85 (detailing recent United States intentions
to effect trade agreements between the United States and Latin and South American
countries). An early trade agreement was the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), signed
in 1983 by former President Reagan and including 23 countries in the Caribbean,
Central and South America. Id. at 285-86. The United States granted duty-free access
to its markets for most Caribbean Basin products, under specific conditions. kd at

286; Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701-2707.
In 1991, the Andean Trade Preference Act was signed into law by President
Bush. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1991). This act, like the CBI, provides duty-free benefits for
Andean Pact countries. Cavitt, supra note 6, at 285-89. Economic cooperation is also
increasing between the regional groups. South America-Caribbean Ties, WALL ST. J.,
Oc.L 20, 1992, at A13.
50. See Cavitt, supra note 6, at 284 (stating that the goal of some states is to
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In Asia, efforts to cooperate on regional economic issues have been
only marginally successful. One of the more profitable regional agreements is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose
members recently agreed to reduce tariffs on exports between signatory
nations!' Other attempts to develop regional economic cooperation call
for Japan to take the lead in the creation of an Asian free trade area.'
After World War H, Japan refrained from assuming an Asia-Pacific regional leadership role to avoid criticism from its Asian neighbors 3
Because of their experience during World War H, many Asians viewed
any political or economic extraterritorial actions by Japan as a renewal
of Japan's pre-war imperialist ambitions. Such fears of Japanese ex-

create a free trade zone throughout the western hemisphere). On June 27, 1990, President Bush announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) to encourage
economic growth in the Americas through initiatives in the areas of trade, investment
and debt. Sylvia Saborio, Bush's Latin American Initiative: A Promising Move, CuiusTiAN Sc. MoNITOR, July 12, 1990, at 8. EAI is designed to support Latin countries
in their efforts to reform their economies and liberalize their international trade and
investment policies. L
51. See K.T. Arasu, NAFTA Seen Cutting Asian Exports by $2 Billion, REumzEs
Bus. REP., Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting
that the ASEAN countries agreed to eliminate all tariffs within 15 years). The tariff
elimination will pave the way for a free trade zone in the region to stimulate interAsian trade. Id ASEAN is the oldest regional organization and includes six countries:.
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei. Ld. However,
Thailand, because of its relatively weak industrial structure, will likely sustain the
most adverse impact on its economy from the tariff reductions, and therefore may not
adhere to the agreement. Id. ASEAN Agreed to NAFTA, KoREAN TIMEs, Oct. 29,
1992, at 17.
52. See Stokes, supra note 42, at 1629 (describing the formation of the East Asia
Economic Group (EAEG)). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the
world's largest regional group, comprising nearly one-half the world's markets. Id.
Malaysia's proposed East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) would have included
the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Clayton Jones, Asia-Pacific
Group Calls for Free Trade, CHmsTAN Sca. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 1983, at 1. This
proposal was not realized partly because the United States opposed it. Id. Instead, the
APEC enlisted as members, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Id. In addition, when
China and South Korea established diplomatic relations, prospects for a North East
Asia Economic Area improved. North East Asia, INE PRESS SERVICF, Aug. 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. A growth area encompassing
the Korean peninsula, Japan, northeastern China, and far-eastern Russia would contain
300 million people. Id.
53. Luney, supra note 28, at 304.
54. Luney, supra note 28, at 303, 304; see House, supra note 11, at A12 (reporting that although World War II ended over 50 years ago, other Asian nations still
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pansionism have been compounded by Japan's refusal to open its markets to other Asian countries, in spite of its extraordinary economic
prosperity.5
Many now believe that these historical fears should no longer obstruct
Asian regional cooperation, especially in light of growing regionalism
within the Western hemisphere.' Japan has begun to respond to these
changing economic circumstances, but to date its actions have been far
short of the demands of other Asian countries. 7 Even if Japan joins a
regional economic pact in Asia, it will likely entail looser ties among
member nations than those created under the NAFTA. 8 Therefore, any
regional Asian trade pact is unlikely to compensate for the trade losses
that will be sustained by Asian countries due to the NAFTA. Most
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), which have relied on United
States markets for a large share of their total exports, will therefore
experience trade problems with the United States after the implementation of the NAFTA. In light of the important trade relations between the
United States and some NICs, individual, bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs) between the United States and individual East Asian nations,

fear and hate Japan).
55. Trade Imbalances in Asia-Pacific Region, KOREA ECON. DAILY, Sept. 9,
1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File [hereinafter Trade Imbalonce]. Korea's estimated 1992 trade deficit with Japan was $7.9 billion even though
Korea had a net trade surplus of $3 billion with other trading partners. S. Korea
Trade Deficit with Japan Seen Narrowing, REUTERS, Oct. 13, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Non-tariff trade barriers are one of the main reasons that foreign products are unsuccessful in the Japanese domestic market. Luney,
supra note 28, at 297, 298 n.9. There is diverse opinion regarding the openness of
the Japanese national economy. See, e.g., Peter Drysdale & Ross Gamaut, A Pacific
Free Trade Area?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLIcY 217, 228 (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 1989) (stating that among Asian countries, Japan's import system for
manufactured goods is unencumbered by regulation and that trade is almost completely impeded by non-tariff barriers. Although Japan's distribution systems are conservative, imported goods from other Asian countries have grown by 50% annually since
1985. IM.
56. See, e.g., Trade Imbalance, supra note 55, at 1 (suggesting that Asia reduce
its dependence on the United States by developing stronger trade ties among Asian
nations); Luney, supra note 28, at 304-05 (describing the prospects and uncertainty of
having Japan take a leading role in creating a regional free trade area).
57. See House, supra note 11, at A12 (suggesting that the potential for an Asian
free trade area depends in part upon the willingness of smaller Asian nations to follow Japan's lead).
58. See Trade Imbalance, supra note 55, at 2 (discussing Japan's unwillingness to
internationalize its economy and lower trade barriers to imports).
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may be an alternative for avoiding economic losses at the hands of the
NAFTA."
IL. PROSPECTS FOR FTAS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND EAST ASIAN NATIONS 6
United States officials, including Senators and Representatives, have

59. See, eg., Kim Dayong-Luan, supra note 44 (discussing Korea's trade depen-

dence on United States markets); Yung-Chul Park & Jung-Ho Yoo, More Free Trade
Areas: A Korean Perspective, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 141,
153-54 (Jeffrey 1. Schott ed., 1989) (suggesting that an FTA between Korea and the
United States is in the best long-term economic interest of Korea, but that Korea may
avoid being locked out of American markets by FTAs between the United States and
other Asian countries); S.C. Tsiang, Feasibility and Desirability of a US-Taiwan Free
Trade Agreement, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 159, 159-62
(Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989) (suggesting that Taiwan would welcome an FA with the
United States). See also It's Time to Think about an FTA with the U.S., KOREA
TMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at 2 (discussing the probable impact of the NAFTA and the
EC on Asian trading control and suggesting that Asian countries seek FTAs with the
United States); KOREAN INSrrr ON ECONONC POLICY, Impact of NAFTA and
Policy Suggestion, KOREA TIMFS, Sept. 21, 1992, at 7 (quoting South Korean President Roh Tae-woo as saying that an Asia-Pacific economic community is untimely at
the present because Korea would participate as a subordinate member, rather than on
an equal basis with other Asian nations). But see President, Asia-Pacific Economic
Community is Untimely, KOREA TME=S, Oct. 31, 1992, at 1 (noting uncertainty over
the President's statement concerning whether he would oppose an FTA with the United States at some future date).
60. Due to the larger size of the economies of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan than
Hong Kong and Singapore, this article focuses on the possibility and probable effects
of an FA between these larger countries and the United States. Since Hong Kong
and Singapore, the remaining NIC countries, have relatively small economies, the
impact on East Asia of any such FTAs involving them would be relatively small. For
instance, in 1991 Taiwan produced 4.7% of American imports, Korea 3.55, Singapore
2%, and Hong Kong 1.9%. Francis G. McFaul, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTs
1991 16 (1992).
In addition, Hong Kong's future economic impact is very uncertain, in light of
the fact that the colony is scheduled to be returned to China in 1997. Nicholas D.
Kristof, China Threatens Hong Kong Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at Al, A4.
In 1988, China and Britain agreed that Hong Kong should continue political and
economic freedom for 50 years after the colony returns to Chinese control in 1997.
Id. However, China recently threatened to breach that agreement to counter British efforts to strengthen its political influence over the colony prior to 1997. Id.
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demonstrated interest in establishing FTAs with Pacific Rim countries."'
These officials appear to be focusing their efforts on the negotiation of
an FTA with Japan, the most formidable trading nation in the world. 2
Nevertheless, an FTA alone between the United States and Japan would
not correct the trade imbalance between the two countries, 3 due to Japanese differences in trade policy, market structure and cultur.e.' Therefore, many American analysts proposed that the United States establish a
broader conception of FTA or promulgate permissable ranges of balanced trade goals with Japan.' Indeed, in a defensive approach to the
threat of United States protectionism, Japan proposed a cooperative
mechanism to reduce the binational trade imbalance, resulting in the
United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) 7 in 1989.
However, it is likely that the trade imbalance between the United States
and Japan will continue to widen, since Japan continues to concentrate
on maintaining its exports to United States markets, rather than moving
to liberalize the Japanese import market.
Japan continues to avoid binational trade agreements, preferring instead to remain under the Most Favored Nations (MFN) protection" of
the GATT, under which Japan can exploit its superiority in manufactured products. Consequently, Japan's economic strategy for balancing
binational trade can be most aptly characterized' as reliance on the

61. Schott, supra note 30, at 27.
62. Schott, supra note 30, at 32. In the late 1980s, there were many proponents
of an FTA between the United States and Japan. Id.; Makoto Kuroda, Strengthening
Japan-U.S. Cooperation and the Concept of Japan-U.S. Free Trade Arrangements, In
FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. FREE TRADE POLICY 121, 122-23 (Jeffrey J. Schott
ed., 1989).

63. Schott, supra note 30, at 35-36; Kuroda, supra note 62, at 127.
64. Robert Z. Lawrence, Comments on Kuroda, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY 131 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989); Clyde Prestowitz, Comments on
Kuroda, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 137 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,
1989).
65. Lawrence, supra note 64, at 131.
66. Schott, supra note 30, at 35.
67. Takagi, Japan to U.S. on Deadline: Impossible, NIKKEI WEEKLY, June 1,
1991, at 1. After the U.S. Presidential election, reports indicated that Japan was preparing a broader binational cooperation scheme in place of SII. Japan, Worry about

New Trade Policy of the U.S., KOREA TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at 10.
68. Schott, supra note 30, at 35.
69. Kuroda, supra note 62, at 129; Japan Should Push GATT Focus in Face of

Growing Regionalism: Success of the UR Will Be a Litmuts Test, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
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GATT to defend itself against aggressive trade pressure = from the
United States on one hand, and cooperation with the United States in
the negotiation of an agreement at the Uruguay Round" on the other.
This standstill between the United States and Japan might be resolved

by the formation of an FTA between the United States and Korea, or
the United States and Latin and South American countries of low wages

will be likely to force Korea and Taiwan to consider an FTA with the
United States:' An FTA between the United States and Korea or Taiwan, in turn, might be an impetus for an FTA between the United
States and Japan because both Korea and Taiwan compete with Japan in
their exports to the United States. Under such a competitive formation

of FTAs, Japan will be more inclined to reform its trade system, rather
than to continue to ignore current external pressures.
Thus, from the perspective of the United States, negotiating a trade

agreement with Korea or Taiwan would be highly desirable in its own
right, and would have the added appeal of exerting pressure on Japan to
open its domestic markets. Taiwan is the United States' sixth largest
trading partner, and its third largest creditor with a $9.8 billion surplus
in 1991" Korea is the United States' seventh largest trading partner,
Aug. 29, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
70. President Clinton supported revision of Super 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1988. Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial
Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAw & POLIcY INT'L Bus. 263,
265-66 nn.15-18 (1991). Critics contend that section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974, and the Super 301 of the 1988 Trade Act, undermine the multilateralism of the
GATT system. Id. For an opinion supporting the use of Section 301, see Id. at
266-69.
71. The Uruguay Round negotiations were initiated in 1986 to promulgate rules
in areas the GAIT fails to regulate, such as services, investment and intellectual
property rights. Alan Riding, Europeans Agree with U.S. on Cutting Form Subsidies;
French Withhold Support, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1992, at Al, A20. While both the
Kennedy Round (1964-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79) concerned tariff reduction,
the Uruguay Round has focused on the adjustment of each country's economic structure, in addition to tariff reduction. I&, Of the 15 areas of negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the most difficult area has been agriculture. Id. Although the EC agreed
with the United States on the reduction of farm subsidies in November 1992, many
obstacles remain, including the rice problem in East Asian countries. Id. Moreover,
even if an agreement from the Uruguay Round is simultaneously submitted to the
United States Congress with the NAFrA, the possibility of disapproval of the Uruguay agreement is significant. kd
72. See Schott, supra note 30, at 29-31 (describing the objectives of signatory
nations to FrAs). One objective of FTAs is avoiding discrimination in the trade context. Park & Ho Yoo, supra note 59, at 153-54; Tsiang, supra note 59, at 160.
73. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. FOREION TRADE HIGLmGrHTs
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and in 1991 it was the sixth largest purchaser of American products.'
By negotiating FTAs with Korea and Taiwan, the United States could
substantially reduce its trade deficit with these nations through the elimination of trade barriers."5 Trade deficits and trade barriers with the other nations in East Asia would also be likely to fall as other East Asian
nations would position themselves to enter similar arrangements with the
United States. The United States might also choose more radical steps to
reduce these trade barriers by balancing bilateral trade flows on a percountry basis.
For Korea and Taiwan, the most important objective of an FTA is to
maintain access to United States markets, 6 since both Asian countries
would continue to suffer economically from increasing United States
protectionism without such agreements. The NAFTA creates a large
obstacle to Korean and Taiwanese access to United States markets.
Another East Asian objective in pursuing an FTA with the United
States is to improve bilateral relations between the region and the United States. Significantly, the establishment through an FTA of a dispute
settlement mechanism would sharply diminish trade disputes between
East Asia and the United States." Under the present regime, all trade
disputes regarding exports by Taiwan and Korea to the United States are
governed by United States law and procedure. This has made the outcome of such disputes less acceptable to the Taiwanese and Koreans,
regardless of the fairness of the process. Moreover, an FTA between
Taiwan or Korea and the United States may be an instrument to enhance political recognition of Taiwan by the United States, and to
strengthen existing diplomatic ties between Korea and the United
States.8

1991 23-25 (1992).
74. IH
75. Clinton's Economics Point Man, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1992, at 17, 23. If
the United States attempts to reduce its trade deficit with Asian countries without
redressing its own trade barriers, the United States will have to formulate policies to
improve the competitiveness of its products, in addition to diminishing the trade barriers of the two countries. Id. Significantly, President Clinton cited American economic
problems as his highest priority, in light of an ailing U.S. domestic economy. litThe
term "Clintonomics" is based on principles from Robert B. Reich and his 1991 book
"The Work of Nations." Ma
76. See Schott, supra note 30, at 29-31 (discussing why market access is a crucial element of FTAs).
77. Id.
78. Both Korea and Taiwan are divided countries. Taiwan assumed a defensivo
position against China's unification efforts, and has attempted to strengthen its rcla-
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Despite the benefits that Korea and Taiwan may gain from an FrA
with the United States, such an agreement is likely to face strong opposition in both Asian countries. Although export industries in the manufacturing sectors would support an FTA, other economic sectors, such as
service industries and agriculture, would be wary of the adverse impact
from competition with U.S. companies. Nevertheless, Korea and Taiwan
must deal with the United States regarding these bilateral issues, with or
without separate FTAs." Moreover, the Uruguay Round is addressing
these same economic issues; if either Taiwan, Korea or Japan opens its
agricultural sector to United States producers, the remaining countries
will be unable to avoid opening up their own agricultural sectors in
order to protect their national interests.
Additionally, an FTA between Korea and the United States is inconsistent with Korea's attempt to diversify its export markets and its growing nationalism.' Over the last five years, Korea has actively improved
its relations with Eastern European countries, Russia, and China, in an
effort to reduce its heavy economic dependence on the United States
and Japan."' Korea has also attempted to upgrade its industrial infrastructure and to diversify the composition of its exports, emphasizing
more capital and technology-intensive products. As a consequence, the

tions with the Western Hemisphere, particularly with the United States. Korea has

assumed a leadership position in conducting a dialogue with North Korea, one of the
most hostile countries in the world. Under the divided circumstances of the peninsula,
Korea must maintain close ties with the United States.
79. Park & Ho Yoo, supra note 59, at 154-55; Tsiang, supra note 59, at 162-63.
80. Korean students staged many demonstrations against the United States, arguing that it was responsible for the nation's division during and after World War 1I,
and for the Korean military suppression of the bloody Kwangju Riot in 1980. See
Fred Hiatt, S. Korea Discovers America-Bashing: Trade Issue Angers All Political
Sectors, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1988, at A14 (noting fierce South Korean activism,
linking farmers to students to business executives); Henry Scott Stokes, Outlook Darkens for South Korean Dissident Leader, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 10, 1980, at A2 (summarizing political events in Korea following the student-led Kwangju Riot). Since 1988,
Korean democracy appears to have been improved and strengthened, such that these
demonstrations are no longer as common. Increasing United States protectionism and
pressure on Korea, though, to open its rice market have created new targets for student activism, with support from Korean farmers making these new movements different from past protests that lacked public support. Exports Pact Unlikely Before Toronto Summit, Yeutter Says, Los ANGELES TN~IES, June 17, 1988, at 8 (discussing
increasing nationalism in Japan and South Korea, including student demonstrations).
81. See Sharp Decrease of Exports to U.S., Japan, and EC, KOREA TZIES, Nov.
14, 1992, at 7 (stating that Korea's exports to the United States and Japan decreased
from 56.6% of its total exports in 1987 to 43.1% in 1991).
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effects of an FTA with the United States on these diversification objectives may be adverse.
As opposed to Korea, Taiwan appears more receptive to the creation
of an FTA with the United States, although it also feels pressure from
powerful agricultural groups seeking to protect their product markets.'
Chinese intervention, however, may provide an additional obstacle to the
development of such an FTA. The Chinese ambassador to the United
States has warned that a Taiwan-United States FTA would violate existing United States-China agreements. 3 It is conceivable, though, that "an
FTA also could be seen by China as a future precedent for bilateral
trade, with near-term benefits if it establishes a trading 'foot in the
door' in Taiwan." '
CONCLUSION
The implementation of the NAFTA will certainly bring free trade
benefits to the North American countries. Unfortunately, the likely trade
diversion effect of the NAFTA threatens the economies of many Asian
countries, which have relied heavily on exports to the United States to
foster their national economic growth. The United States must realize
that a subsequent economic slump in Asia would trigger a decrease in
American exports to East Asia. In addition, the NAFTA alone is not
likely to be effective in reducing the United States trade deficit with
Japan. Korea and Taiwan may attempt to formulate an FTA with the
United States in order to secure access to United States markets and to
cope with increasing North American protectionism under the NAFTA.
In turn, the United States can use FTAs with Korea and Taiwan to exert
pressure on Japan to accept a far broader free trade agreement, since
these three East Asian countries compete with each other in the United
States market.
This article suggests and evaluates the possibilities of free trade agreements between the United States and Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. If such
FTAs proved successful, future FTAs may link the United States and
Pacific Rim countries. The resulting free trade network would accomplish the same results that the United States has pursued through multinational and bilateral trade negotiations.

82. Tsiang, supra note 59, at 159-63; Schott, supra note 30, at 38.
83. Schott, supra note 30, at 39.
84. Schott, supra note 30, at 39.

